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Abstract 
If there were no express provisions in the charter party as to seaworthiness or a ship owner’s obligation to exercise reasonable 
dispatch, there is an implied obligation in common law. At other times, in the absence of an express term, the right to 
nominate a port does not give rise to a correlative warranty on the nomination to a safe port. Likewise, a change of 
circumstances occurring after the conclusion of the contract may be sufficient to discharge the parties from further 
performance of their contract. In common law, the shipper has an implied obligation to inform the ship owner on the 
dangerous nature of the shipped goods. Last but not least, whether the owner of the vessel operates a liner service or a under a 
charter undertakes that his vessel, while performing its obligations under the contract of carriage, will not deviate from the 
contract of carriage. 
Based on theoretical and jurisprudential aspects, this article aims to analyze the consequences of the ship owner’s breach of 
the contract, the implications of express liberty clauses, and where appropriate, the Hague-Visby Rules incorporation effect.  
In conclusion, the obligations have different meanings depending on the type of the contract of affreightment and the 
circumstances in which the obligation must be fulfilled or the moment while operating. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Lumen Research Center in Social and Humanistic Sciences, Asociatia 
Lumen. 
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1. Introduction 
In the absence of an express agreement between charterer and ship owner, the provisions of customary law are 
effective, according to which the ship owner has a number of implied contractual obligations: to provide a 
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seaworthy vessel, to fulfill contractual obligations with reasonable dispatch, to nominate a safe port, not to carry 
dangerous goods, and not to deviate from the agreed route. In respect of customary law these obligations are 
absolute and a breach of contract relieves both parties from any future obligation. However, such effect may be 
lessened by applying the Hague-Visby Rules or the exemption clauses or liberty clauses, if applicable. 
2. Seaworthiness 
If no express stipulations are provided in the charter party regarding seaworthiness, there is an implied 
warranty provided by customary law (Baatz, 2008). The implied warranty is not sourced by the owner’s position 
as a charterer but by his actions as owner of the vessel (Eder, Foxton, Berry, Smith & Bennett, 2011). In the 
customary law the obligation of the owner to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute. Failure to comply with such 
obligation results in owner’s liability, irrespective of the nature of the default (Wilson, 2010). Therefore, the 
usual term of seaworthiness warranty is used as a promise or an absolute guarantee, and not as a notion subject to 
a contractual condition (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). Assessment of seaworthiness is purely objective: “Would the 
owner have sent the vessel in a voyage before the repair of a faulty part if he knew about its existence?” (Carr, 
2009). 
Supposing the provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated in the charter party, the consequence on 
the obligation of seaworthiness shall be significant: obligation consists of exercising due diligence (Baatz, 2008). 
Therefore, even though the owner is not exclusively liable in the absence of any default, they shall remain liable 
not only for his own negligence but for any other party’s act of negligence, including that of an independent 
contractor to whom the responsibility of bringing the vessel to a seaworthy condition is delegated (Wilson, 2010). 
Exemption clauses shall not cover the loss caused by unseaworthiness unless the clause explicitly provides it 
(Baughen, 2009). This is a rule of interpretation much stricter than that applied to the question if the act of 
negligence could be covered by an exception (Baughen, 2009). Therefore, it is of critical importance if the owner 
can prove that the loss is caused by unseaworthiness and not through other contract clauses that can be counted as 
exemption clauses (Baughen, 2009). 
A warranty of seaworthiness implies not only that the owner must do his utmost in terms of preparing the 
vessel, but that the vessel is to be completely prepared to safely deliver its cargo to its destination, taking into 
consideration all possible perils the vessel may encounter during the voyage (Eder et al., 2011). The requested 
seaworthiness depends on the vessel’s characterstics, the contracted voyage and the stages of the voyage varying 
for summer and winter voyages, for rivers, lakes and sea navigation, during the loading, and when it sails 
carrying the contracted merchandise(Eder et al., 2011). The requested level refers to existing skills and standards 
(Treitel & Reynolds, 2005), and in the absence of statutory provisions or standard practices, seaworthiness shall 
not keep the same pace with the latest technological discoveries (Soyer, 2005). 
In the customary law there is a wide variety of situations in which the vessel does not meet the seaworthy 
condition. Examples of defects related to the physical condition of vessel or its equipment that cause the failure to 
meet the seaworthy condition include: inadequate spares, loose hatch covers, lubricating oil with traced sediment, 
contaminated fuel, contaminated cargo holds, and inadequate navigation means and maps (Dockray, 2004). A 
vessel shall also not be seaworthy due to non-operating engines or a faulty compass, or if the stacking of cargo on 
the deck makes the ship unstable if adequate fuel is not provided (Willson, 2010). Inefficacy of the captain and 
crew’s actions may cause the unseaworthiness, and this may consist of a lack of skills or proper education related 
to vessel operation, lack of crew, or declining to properly fulfill their duties (Eder et al., 2011). 
A vessel may not be seaworthy in a non-physical sense too if it lacks the documents provided by flag state law 
or by the law, regulations and practices prescribed by local or governmental authorities of the port of call 
(Baughen, 2009). If the legal requirements are met, the implied warranty cannot be extended to the recommended 
level of competence or the employment requirements of organizations such as unions (Wilson, 2010). A warranty 
of seaworthiness encompasses the obligation of having adequate means on board of loading and unloading, and 
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the obligation shall be implied when the freight agreement states that cargo is loaded or unloaded with no 
expense to the ship (Eder et al., 2011). A vessel does not meet the seaworthiness requirement if no system of 
handling usual incidents is in operation, including a system that assures the proper stowage of cargo for the safety 
of the vessel (Eder et al., 2011). 
It is often very difficult to make a clear distinction between the lack of a vessel’s potential to carry its cargo in 
good condition and the improper stowage of cargo (Carr, 2009). When it affects only the safety of the vessel, the 
unproper stowage may be identified as a lack of potential to carry the cargo in good condition (Carr, 2009; Eder 
et al., 2011). Improper stowage that could only damage cargo is nothing other than unproper stowage, and in this 
case the vessel maintains its seaworthiness even though the sole purpose of voyage is cargo transportation (Eder 
et al., 2011). This distinction shall remain crucially important in a bill of lading when the charterer does not 
assume the obligation of stowage, as this is the loader’s obligation (Baughen, 2009). 
The warranty of seaworthiness is effective in different stages of freight agreements and is not a continuing 
warranty for the whole voyage duration (Baughen, 2009). This is known as the doctrine of stages (Baughen, 
2009). As far as a voyage charter party is concerned, the warranty of seaworthiness is effective at the time the 
vessel commences her voyage (Wilson, 2010). It is irrelevant whether there are any defects that lead to 
unseaworthiness during the preliminary voyage or even during the loading process, provided that the required 
repairs are done by the time of the vessel’s departure (Wilson, 2010). Similarly, the warranty ceases if the vessel, 
seaworthy at the time of departure, obtains defects during the voyage or in an intermediate port (Wilson, 2010). 
As far as the consecutive voyage charter party is concerned, the owner shall provide a seaworthy vessel at 
each voyage commencement (Eder et al., 2011). Similarly, when the voyage is in stages by parties’ agreement, 
the warranty is that the ship on starting on each particular stage is fit for that stage (Wilson, 2010). The warranty 
is effective only at the time of vessel delivery, according to the contract (Wilson, 2010). As for the fuel supply, 
due to needs of a commercial nature, a recurrent obligation is prescribed that in the first port of each stage of 
bunkering sufficient fuel is to be provided for the respective stage, with a margin for unforeseen events (Eder et 
al., 2011). It is entirely up to the ship owner to establish the stages of bunkering before the voyage 
commencement, provided that these stages are usual and reasonable (Eder et al., 2011). 
The implied warranty concerning the vessel’s potential to carry the cargo in good condition is effective from 
the commencement of loading; it is not a continuing warranty in the sense that the goods shall continue after 
being loaded on board to be adequately stored during that stage until the vessel is ready to sail, not to mention the 
possibility of accident occurrence during the voyage (Wilson, 2010).   
If anything happens whereby the goods are damaged during the voyage due to unseaworthiness, the ship 
owner shall remain liable even if the loss is partially attributable to other causes, as long as the vessel’s 
unseaworthiness is the real and actual cause of loss (Carr, 2009). 
Unseaworthiness may be proved by any person who claims it (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005; Baughen, 2009). The 
court may in this case use assumptions. It is considered an inevitable suspicion of unseaworthiness when a 
particular thing or event jeopardises the safety of the vessel and her cargo and could cause significant damage to 
carried goods or makes it legally or practically impossible to sail the vessel or load/unload the goods (Dockray, 
2004). Also, the provisions of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) may help the court to 
assess seaworthiness but they are not decisive (Eder et al., 2011). 
Seaworthiness is considered to be an intermediate term, and therefore, the right of the charterer in considering 
the contract terminated as a consequence of warranty breach depends on how non-compliance with the 
contractual obligations deprives him of all the benefits of the contract (Wilson, 2010). It is also possible that a 
blunt refusal of providing a seaworthy vessel, even concerning a minor aspect, is an indicator of such a lack of 
cooperation that this in itself constitutes a fundamental breach of the contract stipulations (Treitel & Reynolds, 
2005). Also, in a time charter party the presence of a cancelling clause entitles the charterer to terminate the 
contract if the vessel is not seaworthy at a given time (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). 
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Regardless of the right of the charterer to consider the contract terminated due to a breach of any implied 
warranty, the ship owner shall be liable for any loss caused by a warranty breach, unless it is expressly protected 
by exceptions provided in the bill of lading or charter party (Eder et al., 2011). 
When a failure to comply with contractual obligation is identified before the execution of the contract, the 
charterer is entitled to terminate the contract provided that the charterer is substantially deprived of contract 
benefits and such failures cannot be remedied in a reasonable time to prevent the object of the contract from 
being frustrated (Wilson, 2010). However, if the effects of failure are less important, the charterer shall only have 
the right to claim damages (Wilson, 2010). It must be taken into consideration the fact that even a short delay has 
different impacts on charter parties, whether they are time charter parties or voyage charter parties (Wilson, 
2010). When unseaworthiness is identified after the sailing of the vessel, mere acceptance of the ship does not 
mean the party waives any claims for damages or the right to terminate the contract, provided that failure to 
comply with the contractual obligations is of critical importance (Wilson, 2010). 
3.  Obligation to comply with contractual obligation within a reasonable time 
Many charterparties contain explicit stipulations concerning the captain’s obligation to execute the voyage 
with utmost dispatch (NYPE 1993, cl.8; Asbatankvoy, cl.1) or reasonable dispatch (Tankervoy 1987, cl.3). 
Where there is no such stipulation, customary law provides an implied obligation of the ship owner to execute 
obligations with reasonable dispatch (Derrington & Panna, 2000).  
Implied warranty is an intermediate term of contract (Eder et al., 2011). It means that if such a breach of 
warranty causes a delay that prejudices the essence of the contract itself, depriving the charterer of the whole 
benefit of contract or causes contract frustration that affects the commercial scope of the contract, the charterer 
may refuse to fulfill his own contractual obligations (Eder et al., 2011). 
If the delay is not sufficiently important to produce such effects, the charterer may not refuse to load but the 
ship owner shall be liable for damages unless such delay is caused by excepted perils (Eder et al., 2011).  
The above effects may be diminished by the fact that such a delay is often subject to legal actions concerning 
route deviation and the liberty clauses that allow something otherwise unacceptable, such as a delay or deviation 
from routes, as well as the fact that line vessels are interested in avoiding delays that exceed their normal 
schedules (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). 
This obligation translates differently in accordance with the type of contract. In a voyage charter party there is 
an implied obligation that the vessel shall commence her voyage and load and unload the agreed goods within a 
reasonable time (Wilson 2010). As far as consecutive voyage charter is concerned, the obligation to commence 
the voyage within a reasonable time implies that such a vessel shall complete as many voyages as possible within 
the agreed charter period (Eder et al., 2011). As for the time charters, it is expected that the captain completes 
every voyage with maximum dispatch (Wilson, 2010). In all the above cases the contractual obligation execution 
is not evaluated on a theoretical basis solely, but acknowledges existing circumstances at the time of contract 
execution, taking into consideration what is reasonably expected (Wilson, 2010). 
4. Obligation to nominate a safe port 
More often than not, charter parties contain an express term concerning safety, specifying that “The vessel 
shall be employed in such lawful trades between safe ports and safe places… excluding… as the Charterers shall 
direct” (NYPE 1993, cl.5). If such an express term is not stipulated, the right of nominating a port does not 
always entail a correlative obligation to nominate a safe port (Wilson, 2010). Therefore, the right of nominating a 
port from a list of ports (ex. Sidney, Melbourne, Brisbane) does not entail an implied warranty of safety just 
because it is assumed that the ship owner, by accepting the port to be identified in the contract, accepted any risk 
related to its safety (Wilson, 2010). It is possible that a contract stipulates that the charterer is entitled to nominate 
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such port from a number of ports uncategorised specifically (ex. Ghana/Nigeria) (Wilson, 2010). In respect of a 
voyage charter party the safety warranty is not implied, but rather it depends on the specific terms of the contract 
and if on this implied condition depends the commercial efficacy of the contract itself (Wilson, 2010). As for the 
time charter parties, when the ship owner puts the vessel at the charterer’s disposal a warranty concerning the 
safety of each nominated port is invariably implied (Wilson, 2010). 
Whether the port is stipulated in the contract or is nominated by charterer, it is assumed that the charterer shall 
be entitled to designate a particular berth or more in that port (Wilson, 2010). When the right to designate a 
particular berth is effective in a port with an express warranty as to safety, such warranty shall cover the berth too 
with the consequence that the charterer has an implied obligation to designate a safe berth (Wilson, 2010). The 
express warranty as to safety may be excluded by other contractual clauses (i.e. clauses concerning risk of 
warfare) (Baughen, 2009). 
Where the contract stipulates that the vessel must head to a nominated port or a designated berth, or one or 
more nominated ports/berths as ordered, though there is no stipulation regarding safety, the charterer shall not 
bear any obligation concerning their safety (Eder et al., 2011). However, the charterer bears an implied obligation 
not to nominate an impossible port (Eder et al., 2011). 
Where the right to designate a particular berth is effective in a port without a warranty of safety by 
jurisprudence, there is no implied obligation of designating a safe berth (Wilson, 2010). When the safety of a 
berth and not of the port is guaranteed, the obligation of the charterer is to designate a particular berth where the 
vessel can safely lie afloat, except when the port as a whole or all its berths are affected by perils (Eder et al., 
2011). 
The classic definition of a safe port implies that a port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, a 
particular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some abnormal occurrence, being 
exposed to danger that cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship (Dockray, 2004). It is quite 
difficult to draw up a priori a list of situations in which a port is unsafe according to the above classic definition 
(Carr, 2009). As a rule, the classic definition of a safe port above stands true (Eder et al., 2011). That is why, 
according to jurisprudence, excessive draught, ice, deficient anchorage or a lack of an adequate canal monitoring 
system can render a port unsafe (Baatz, 2008). The mere existence of perils does not deem a port unsafe (Baatz, 
2008). A port otherwise unsafe could become safe if there is a secure warning system that allows the dangers to 
be avoided. Therefore, a port can be safe for a ship even though the ship may have to leave it when certain 
weather conditions are imminent. Nevertheless, such a port is not safe for the ship unless there is reasonable 
assurance (sufficient tugboats and pilots, enough space and an adequate system to ensure the availability of such 
space) that the imminence of such weather conditions will be recognised in time and that the ship will be able to 
leave the port safely (Baatz, 2008). 
Apart from physical and meteorological causes, a port shall be deemed unsafe if there is a danger for the 
vessel and her cargo to enter and use a port that is unsafe from a political point of view (Eder et al., 2011). Unlike 
the situations that require an evaluation of the physical characteristics of a port, it would be much more difficult 
to evaluate whether a port is unsafe for political reasons (Baughen, 2009).  
Not any danger can make a port unsafe (Wilson, 2010). In the case of temporary dangers, including high 
winds, dead tides and grounding on sandbanks, it is assumed that the captain shall wait for a reasonable period of 
time until the danger disappears or is eliminated (Wilson, 2010). Only when the resulting delay is excessive, 
making the execution of the contract impossible, shall the warranty of safety be considered breached (Wilson, 
2010). Even if the delay is long enough, it does not constitute a breach itself but rather it proves that the charterer 
did not fulfill his obligation assumed at the time of port nomination (Eder et al., 2011).  
A charterer’s obligation to nominate a safe port refers to the port’s safety at the time it is used and not its 
safety at the time of nomination (Wilson, 2010). A port may not be safe at the time of placing the order provided 
that it is safe at the time of the vessel’s arrival (Baatz, 2008). After contradictory decisions as to the nature of the 
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charterer’s commitment, it has been determined that his contractual promise is not continuous but rather it refers 
to the future safety of the port at the time of nomination (Wilson, 2010; Carr, 2009; Baughen, 2009). 
The charterer shall be liable for the normal characteristics of the port, whether or not they are known (Baatz, 
2008). The charterer’s liability does not extend to unforeseen or abnormal events (Carr, 2009). The unforeseen 
and abnormal event requirement is cumulative (Eder et al., 2011). An event may be abnormal and expected at the 
same time, and the charterer shall be liable if he does not give effective new instructions (Eder et al., 2011). On 
the other hand, any worsening of pre-existing safety incidents shall not prevent a port from being deemed unsafe 
at the time of nomination (Baughen, 2009). 
The ship owner may refuse to nominate a port if he is aware that the port is naturally unsafe (Wilson, 2010). If 
he elects to ignore the danger and enters the nominated port, his conduct may equal novus actus interveniens that 
prevents him from claiming any compensation for the damages suffered subsequently (Wilson, 2010). If the 
circumstances that justified the original choice of safe port changed, the charterer should have the right (at least 
for the time charterparties) and the obligation to nominate a new safe port (Baughen, 2009). The subordinate 
obligation exists during the whole voyage to port and the period the vessel remains in the port regardless of 
whether loading/unloading were completed or not, provided that the ship could avoid the danger by leaving the 
port in safety (Eder et al., 2011). If the new danger could not be avoided so as a new port could not be effectively 
nominated, the charterers are not liable for the damages suffered by the vessel during her stay in the port (Eder et 
al., 2011). It is not yet clear whether the subordinate obligation to nominate a safe port when the original choice 
becomes unsafe is applied to voyage charter parties or to time charter parties for a particular voyage (Eder et al., 
2011; Baatz, 2008). The proper answer in this case is negative. As far as the voyage charter parties are concerned, 
the commitment of nominating a safe port may be considered a condition that confers to the ship owner the right 
to terminate the future execution of a breached contract (Wilson, 2010). Actually, there may be contractual 
clauses covering this possibility, or may be included the stipulation “as near as she can safely get” (Wilson, 
2010). 
The consequences of breaching the warranty of safe port nomination may be as follows: claims for physical 
damages sustained by the vessel; alternative consequences when no physical damages incurred but the ship 
owner may claim the costs implied by danger avoidance (i.e. hiring of tugboats, barges transshipment where there 
is an excessive draught); and claims for delay damages when the vessel is stuck in port due to temporary 
obstacles (i.e. sandbanks, warfare), provided that the delay made the port unsafe (Wilson, 2010). 
5. Obligation of not carrying dangerous goods 
In the customary law the shipper has an implied obligation to inform the ship owner of the dangerous nature of 
any carried goods (Carr, 2009). Therefore, the shipper cannot defend himself by claiming a lack of knowledge of 
the dangerous nature of the goods (Baughen, 2009). A similar obligation entails regardless of whether the goods 
are shipped according to a contract of lease governed by a bill of lading or a charter party, although for the latter 
the implied obligation shall be confirmed by an express stipulation in the contract (Wilson, 2010).  
Regardless of meaning, according to English jurisprudence the term “dangerous” transcends the aspects that 
may cause physical loss or damage to the vessel, crew or goods or may generate expenses or delays, and outlines 
the characteristics of goods that may lead to vessel detention (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). 
Even though is not clear whether the implied warranty from the customary law constitutes an absolute 
obligation (Carr, 2009), many decisions seem to endorse this point of view (Baughen, 2009; Wilson, 2010). 
Similarly, in the USA, the consignor’s warranty was originally deemed to be absolute (Tetley, 2008). Some 
courts subsequently held that the obligation was limited (Tetley, 2008). Therefore, the shipper’s liability depends 
on an actual or implicit awareness of the dangerous nature of the goods (Tetley, 2008). Some courts would still 
favour the old theory: an absolute liability upon the shipper (Tetley, 2008).  Once the notification is made, it is 
considered in the customary law that the consignor is discharged from any further liability, and even if the 
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shipper agrees to carry the goods, the shipper shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting therefrom 
(Wilson, 2010).  
The burden of proof regarding the missing notification of the dangerous nature of goods is borne by the ship 
owner (Carr, 2009). The only exception to this principle is when the shipper breaches a contractual term (Wilson, 
2010). Where the ship owner or his agent have the possibility to acknowledge the dangerous nature of goods, the 
shipper is relieved from liability (Eder et al., 2011). According to the same principle, when both parties agree that 
a certain kind of goods is to be carried and they both know its nature and any certain difficulties that may occur 
are known by the parties at the time of contracted freight, the charterer shall not be held responsible for any loss 
or delay caused by the shipment of goods (Eder et al., 2011). 
As an exception, the shipper shall be liable when the special characteristics of goods could not be 
acknowledged, making it impossible to take preventive measures, or when the risks are of the same nature with 
the ones that the shipper must foresee but show variations that equal a difference in the nature of the risks (Eder 
et al., 2011). 
 
6. Obligation not to deviate from the agreed route 
The ship owner, whether operating line vessels or chartering the ship, assumes an implied obligation for his 
ship that during the freight agreement execution the ship shall not deviate from the agreed route (Wilson, 2010). 
In the absence of an agreed contractual route it is assumed that the route shall be a straight geographical route 
unless the ship owner can prove the existence of an usual route (Carr, 2009; Baatz, 2008). When the reasonable 
and usual route (even if it is followed by the vessel of a single line service) becomes impassable the owner may, 
unless the contract becomes impossible to be executed, be forced to follow the route that is reasonable and usual 
at the time of voyage (Eder et al., 2011). Deviation from the route is not a breach of contract (Derrington & 
Panna, 2000) but rather an act of negligence related to navigation that is usually an excepted peril (Treitel & 
Reynolds, 2005). Delays in contract execution may constitute deviation from the agreed route as the delayed 
execution of an insured contract may constitute a default based on an insurance policy (Eder et al., 2011).  
According to customary law, deviation from the agreed route is allowed in strictly determined circumstances 
(Wilson, 2010). Thus, the deviation is allowed for the purpose of saving human lives or to communicate with a 
vessel in danger when a risk to human life is involved (Wilson, 2010). It is a principle of strict interpretation and 
shall not extend to saving property during the life-saving process (Carr, 2009) unless expressly stipulated in the 
contract (Derrington & Panna, 2000). Therefore, the principle shall not extend its effects to tugging a vessel when 
human life is not in danger (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). Deviation is also justified for the avoidance of danger for 
the vessel and goods (Wilson, 2010). The risk may be caused by weather conditions such as storm, fog or ice, or 
political hazards such as the commencement of war or fear of being captured by hostile forces (Wilson, 2010). A 
temporary impediment (i.e. lack of tugs or neap tides) shall not be taken into consideration (Wilson, 2010). On 
the other hand, the deviation is justified if determined by a breach of contract (unseaworthiness or a necessity to 
unload dangerous goods or to restack the goods) (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). The owner is allowed to deviate 
from the agreed route when the charterer does not comply with the obligation of loading a full cargo (Wilson, 
2010). Last but not least, it was held that deviation from the route is justified if there is a common practice to use 
a fuel supply in a particular port outside the usual route (Baughen, 2009).  
Charter parties often contain so-called “liberty clauses”, or deviation clauses, according to which “[a] ship has 
liberty to call at any port, in any order, for any purpose, to sail without pilots, tow or assist vessels for all 
purposes and to deviate from the route for the purpose of saving life and/or property.” (Gencon 1994, clause 3). 
The interpretation given by jurisprudence is that “any port in any order” means the vessel may call at ports that 
are usually its port of call in the designated voyage (Wilson, 2010; Derrington & Panna, 2000). If the stipulation 
14   Oana Adăscăliţei /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  92 ( 2013 )  7 – 15 
only writes “in any port” it shall be construed that the vessel shall have liberty to call at such ports in their 
geographical order (Wilson, 2010; Derrington & Panna, 2000). 
Such clauses are strictly interpreted to the detriment of ship owner (Baatz, 2008), and in the context of other 
clauses that describe the freight agreement (Derrington & Panna, 2000; Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). When 
analysing the liberty clauses a distinction should be made between those clauses which, interpreted literally, 
allow the cancellation of the contract and clauses that establish the rights and liberties of parties in the event of 
uncontrollable obstacles preventing the execution according to the original terms of contract (Eder et al., 2011). 
Where the contract incorporates the Hague-Visby Rules it is of interest to see if a conflict arises between these 
rules and deviation clauses, since the latter may be viewed as a possibility of lessening the ship owner’s liability, 
which is null and void according to Article III (8) of the Hague-Visby Rules (Baatz, 2008; Wilson, 2010). 
Argument shall not apply if the clause is construed as defining the voyage parameters, rather then a liberty clause 
viewed as an exemption clause (Baughen, 2009; Wilson, 2010). 
A vessel that deviates unjustified from the route commits a serious breach of contract (Eder et al., 2011). The 
other party may elect to consider the breach a refusal to fulfill obligations that terminate the contract and sue for 
damages, or may waive his right to consider it a final refusal to fulfill obligations and reserve the right to sue for 
damages (Eder et al., 2011). In this case, all contractual terms, including exceptions and stipulations concerning 
limited liability, shall continue to apply (Wilson, 2010). The ship owner shall claim freight and general average 
contribution, the owner of good being limited to appeal for any loss attributable to deviation and not covered by 
an exception (Wilson, 2010). The situation is quite different when the aggrieved party chooses to terminate the 
contract. The liability of the ship owner is that of a usual shipper, a strict liability (Wilson, 2010). Therefore, he is 
not entitled to refer to any contractual exceptions, nor the stipulations, for any limitation of liability (Wilson, 
2010). Only three exceptions are provided by customary law: an Act of God, Acts of the Queen’s enemies, and 
inherent vice. However, none of them shall apply unless it is proved that the relevant loss would have been 
covered regardless of deviation (Baughen, 2009; Wilson, 2010). The classic example is the vessel that during 
World War I deviated 107 miles from the route to deliver other goods and was sunk by enemy submarines. It was 
held that the owner may not count on the exception “acts of the King’s enemies” unless he proved that the vessel 
would have had the same fate without deviation, which was impossible to prove (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). 
The ship owner may lose the right to claim freight, but if the goods are delivered to the destination, the owner 
shall be entitled, subject to clear clauses to the contrary, to recover a reasonable amount as freight based on the  
quantum meruit principle (Eder et al., 2011). Since the vessel executes a voyage not stipulated in the contract, the 
ship owner may not appeal to the exceptions provided by the Hague-Visby Rules (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005; 
Wilson, 2010). However, according to jurisprudence, the exceptions concerning limited liability (Article IV, 
paragraph 5) and the limitation period (Article III, paragraph 6) may be applied (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005; 
Wilson, 2010). 
Deviation from the route shall not affect the rights already acquired by the ship owner before deviation. 
Therefore, the owner may sue for dead freight or demurrage in the loading port (Wilson, 2010). In the unloading 
port the situation is slightly different: unloading in a fixed period of time relieves the charterer from liability, 
although he remains liable for unloading within a reasonable period of time (Eder et al., 2011). The owner may 
still sue for damages caused by delay according to customary law (Treitel & Reynolds, 2005). A final aspect 
worth mentioning is that the ship owner may always count on exceptions provided in the bill of lading or charter 
party concerning any loss suffered before the vessel’s deviation (Wilson, 2010). 
Conclusions 
In respect of charter party, implied obligations depend on the type of contract, circumstances in which the 
obligations are fulfilled and the time they are executed. Most implied obligations (except the obligation not to 
deviate from the route) are viewed as intermediate terms and therefore the charterer’s right to terminate the 
contract depends on the loss of benefits he might suffer by non-performance of the contract. Such effects may be 
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lessened by including a liberty clause, whereas a cancellation clause confers the right to consider the contract 
terminated. Where the commercial scope of contract is not affected, only damages may be claimed. 
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